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Communication of Where an Event
Occurred by a Gorilla
(Gorilla gorilla gorilla)
Megan L. Hoffman
Florida International
University
Episodic-like memory for the "where" component of unique
events was examined in an adult gorilla (Gorilla gorilla gorilla). The gorilla witnessed a unique event, performed by an
experimenter (e.g. watching an experimenter blow bubbles)
at one of three locations surrounding his enclosure. After a 4
to 17 minute retention interval, a tester presented the gorilla
with photographs of the three locations, which were mounted
on wooden cards, and asked the gorilla where the event had
occurred. The gorilla communicated his choice by handing a
card to the tester and was rewarded if correct. The gorilla was
significantly above chance at identifying the event location.
Results suggest that the gorilla was not responding on the basis
of familiarity by choosing the most recently visited location,
but choosing the location where the event occurred.

Episodic memory refers to the ability to
mentally travel back in time, and consciously
re-experience events from one's past (Tulving,
1993; 2002). Schwartz and Evans (2001) have
argued that the defining features of episodic
memory are: long memory based on unique
events from one's past, experiencing feelings
of pastness when those memories are retrieved, and feelings of confidence in those
memories. Until recently, it was assumed that
episodic memory was unique to humans
(Tulving, 2002; Schwartz, in press). A large
number of memory systems such as working
memory, procedural memory (or reference
memory), and long semantic memory have
been found to operate in non-human animals
(Mercado, Uyeyama, Pack, a Herman, 1999).
However, only recently has there been increased research concerning if animals have

episodic memory similar to humans (Clayton,
Yu, and Dickinson, 2001; Menzel, 1999;
Schwartz, Colon, Sanchez, Rodriguez, Et Evans,
2002; Schwartz, Meissner, Hoffman, Evans, Et
Frazier, 2003). Because episodic memory
involves a private conscious experience, accompanied by feelings of pastness upon retrieval, it is difficult to demonstrate episodic
memory in non-human animals (Schwartz, in
press). Unlike humans who can readily report
their conscious experiences through the use of
language, most animals are unable to communicate their conscious experiences to humans.
Therefore, definitions of episodic-like memory
have been created to describe the behavioral
criteria that must be met by non-human animals, in order to support the hypothesis that
they are experiencing episodic memory that is
similar to human episodic memory.
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Spatial Memory in Great Apes
Several studies have explored memory
for the "where" component of unique events
in great apes, by using simulated foraging
tasks (Gibeault and MacDonald, 2002;
MacDonald, 1994, MacDonald and Agnes, 1999;
Menzel 1973; Tinklepaugh, 1932). MacDonald
(1994) explored the spatial memory of an
adult and juvenile gorilla (Gorilla gorilla
gorilla) using a simulated foraging task. In
this study, half of the total number of food
sites in an enclosure were baited with food. A
gorilla was allowed to enter the enclosure and
forage freely. After the foraging process was
complete, the gorilla was encouraged to leave
the enclosure. After a delay, the same food
sites were rebaited with food, and the subject
was reintroduced into the enclosure, and
allowed to find and consume the food. The
adult gorilla was accurate at remembering
which locations had previously contained food
after retention intervals of 24 hours, and the
juvenile gorilla was accurate at remembering
which locations had previously contained food
after retention intervals of 10 minutes. In a
similar study by MacDonald and Agnes (1999)
orangutans (Pongo pygmaeus abelii) also
exhibited above chance accuracy at remembering which locations had previously contained food after retention intervals of 10
minutes.
Tinidepaugh (1932) examined the
spatial memory of two chimpanzees (Pan
troglodytes). A chimpanzee was led into
several different rooms, and watched as an
experimenter hid food in one member of a
pair of containers located in each room.
Then, the chimpanzee was removed from the
area, and, after a delay interval, was allowed
to revisit the rooms and search for the hidden
food. The chimpanzees were highly accurate
at remembering which pair of containers
contained food, even for as many as 10 pairs
of containers.
In a similar study, E. Menzel (1973)
investigated spatial memory in 6 chimpanzees
(Pan troglodytes). One chimpanzee witnessed
food being hidden in 18 different locations in
an enclosure while the other 5 chimpanzees
did not observe the food being hidden, and
thus served as controls. After a 2 minute
retention interval, all of the chimpanzees
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were allowed to search the enclosure. As was predicted, the chimpanzee who had observed the
foods being hidden retrieved the majority of the
foods compared to the control subjects, suggesting that the observe chimpanzee had extensive
knowledge of where the foods had been hidden.
In a follow-up study, Menzel (1973) demonstrated
that when preferred foods were hidden at some
locations and less preferred foods were hidden
at other locations, the observer chimpanzee recovered the more preferred foods first, suggesting that the chimpanzee also possessed knowledge of what had been hidden in addition to where
it was hidden.
C. Menzel (1999) examined memory for
unique events in a language-trained chimpanzee
(Pan troglodytes), Panzee, for both "what" and
"where" components. Panzee watched as an
experimenter hid foods and objects in different
locations outside of her enclosure. Panzee used
a lexigram keyboard to spontaneously communicate information about what had been hidden,
and pointed to indicate where the object had been
hidden, up to 16 hours after the event had took
place. Using the information Panzee provided,
experimentally blind testers were able to locate
the hidden food and objects outside of her enclosure. Because Panzee was highly accurate
when reporting the information, this suggests that
she was able to recall "what" and "where" components of unique events.
Episodic-Like Memory in Birds
Clayton and Dickinson (1998) proposed
that episodic memory contains information about
"what" occurred, "where" it occurred, and
"when" it occurred. Furthermore, these components (what, where, and when) are bound together in a memory for that event. With this
criteria in mind, Clayton et al. (2001) examined
episodic-like memory in food-storing scrub jays
(Aphelocoma coerulescens) using a caching task
that required the scrub jays to form integrated
memories of "what", "where", and "when" information. The scrub jays were given perishable
and nonperishable foods, which they were allowed
to cache in trail-unique locations at different
times. Later they were allowed to recover the
foods they cached. It was demonstrated that the
scrub jays were capable of remembering the location of their cache sites, the content of the
cache sites and the relative time since the items
were cached. Furthermore, all three components

needed to be remembered correctly in order for
the jays to respond correctly, suggesting that the
what, where, and when components of caching
events were bound together in memory.
Zentall, Clement, Bhatt, and Allen (2001)
examined episodic-like memory in pigeons (Columbia livia). Pigeons were trained to peck or
not peck using a symbolic system. Then, on some
trials, after a short retention interval, an unexpected test was given to the pigeons, requiring
them to respond as to whether they had just recently pecked or not pecked. The results suggest that pigeons were able to comment on specific action events that they had recently performed. However, the retention interval did not
exceed the limits of working memory, and therefore cannot be considered evidence of episodic—
like memory.
Memory for Action Events in a Dolphin
A similar study, carried out by Mercado,
Uyeyama, Pack, and Herman (1999) measured
memory for recently performed events in a
bottlenosed dolphin (Tursiops truncatus). The
dolphin, Elele, was asked through human gestural instruction to perform an action event with
a specific object. Then on randomly determined
trials, she was given the gestural sign for "repeat" after a short delay interval, instructing her
to repeat the action she had recently performed.
Although the delay interval did not require retrieval from long memory, the dolphin was able
to communicate her memory for multiple components of an event (the action she performed
and and the object used) on random tests.
Palinscopic Memory in a Gorilla: Reference to
the Past
Another definition of episodic-like
memory focuses on the palinscopic nature of
episodic memory. Tutving and Lepage (2000)
have argued that episodic memory involves
"palinscopic" memory (memory that concerns
the past), rather than "proscopic" memory
(memory which concerns the present).
Schwartz (in press) has proposed that episodic
memory has the following qualities: (1) it must
be based on trial-unique learning, (2) it requires retrieval from long-term memory, and
most importantly (3) subjects must comment
on events that occurred in the past
(palinscopic memory), rather than display
knowledge of the current state of the world
(proscopic memory). With the exception of
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the Mercado et al. (1999) study and the Zentall
et al. (2001) study, experiments that have
investigated episodic-like memory have only
concerned proscopic memory. In these studies
(e.g. Clayton et aL, 2001), animals only have
to remember where food is currently located,
which could be accomplished by semantic
memory, rather than episodic memory
(Schwartz, in press).
In the first study examining palinscopic
memory at long-term memory retention intervals in non-humans, Schwartz et al. (2002)
examined episodic-like memory in King, a male
western lowland gorilla (Gorilla gorilla gorilla). In a series of experiments, an experimenter presented King with a unique feeding
event, and after a delay, King was asked what
he had eaten, and who had given him the
particular cards, which symbolically represented the fruits and experimenters used in
the experiment, and he could use these cards
to communicate his response to the tester.
Because the food had been consumed, and the
experimenter who had presented the food was
no longer present, King was required to comment on an event that occurred in the past,
rather than communicate his knowledge of the
present state of the world.
King was significantly above chance at
identifying both the "what" and "who" components of trial-unique feeding events, both at
short retention-intervals of 7 minutes and long
retention-intervals of 24 hours, both of which
exceed the limits of working memory and
require retrieval from long-term memory. In
another study, Schwartz et al. (2003) demonstrated that King was significantly above
chance at identifying familiar, and unfamiliar
people (who component) and novel objects
(what component) after short retention of 7
minutes, which presumably require retrieval
from long-term memory. The present study
examined palinscopic memory of where a
unique event had occurred, after long-term
memory retention intervals. Because King was
accurate at remembering both the "what" and
"where" components of unique past events,
the hypothesis was that King would be able to
remember the "where" component of unique
events and communicate this memory by
handing the tester the photo card of the
appropriate location.

Method
Subject
King, a male western lowland gorilla (Gorilla gorilla gorilla), served as the subject. At
the time of the experiment King was 32 years
old, weighed approximately 227 kg (500 lb), and
stood approximately 1.5 m (5 ft) tall. King was
born in Cameroon, but was brought to the United
States at the age of 2, where he was raised in a
circus. He was moved to Monkey Jungle in Miami, Florida 22 years ago, at the age of 10. King
has been the subject of a study on mirror self
recognition (Swartz Et Evans, 1994), experiments
on episodic memory (Schwartz et al., 2002), and
a study on event memory and misinformation
effects (Schwartz et aL, 2003).
Environment and Stimuli
Environment King's environment at Monkey Jungle consisted of an indoor/outdoor
enclosure, connected by a tunnel to an outdoor
exhibit. King was tested in the indoor/outdoor
enclosure from 9:00 - 10:00 in the morning, before being released into his outdoor exhibit. An
event was presented at one of three distinctive
stimulus locations surrounding the indoor/outdoor enclosure: the main cage, the nighthouse,
or the tunnel gate. Testing for memory of the
event location was always done in a separate cage
because it was removed from the three locations.
During both the presentation and testing phases
of the experiment, King had access to the entire
indoor/outdoor enclosure (the main cage, test
cage, and nighthouse), and could move to another area if he did not want to participate in
the experiment.
Stimuli At the time of test King was given
photographs of alt three locations and could communicate where the event had occurred by handing a photo card back to the tester. The photographs were taken from King's perspective inside the enclosure. The photographs measured
8.89 cm (3 by 12.70 cm (5n), and were mounted
behind acrylic panels, on wooden cards measuring 20.32 cm (8") by 13.97 cm (5 by 3.81 cm (1.5").
Design and Analysis
The binomial test was used to determine
whether King's responses differed from what
would be predicted by chance. Because King had
three location cards to choose from, chance performance was assumed to be 33%.
Procedure
The experiment was conducted an aver64

age of two days per week during the month of
March, April, and May of 2003. An average of
three trials were run on each day of testing. A
total of 60 trials were completed, with 20 trials
at each of the three locations. The trials were
randomized, so that neither King, nor the tester
could predict the event location on any given
trial.
Presentation Phase King witnessed a
novel event, performed by a familiar person
(M.LH., C.A.M., SE, or G.T.), at one of three
distinct locations: the main cage, the
nighthouse, or the tunnel gate. The novel
events included such things as watching an
experimenter put on a "de Brazza" monkey
mask and watching an experimenter blow
bubbles. On some trials, King was given a
small amount of fruit as an incentive to come
over to the event location. The event lasted
approximately 1 to 2 minutes. In order to
ensure that the tester was experimentally
blind and unable to cue King to the correct
answer, the tester was kept out of view of the
three stimulus locations during the presentation of the event. After the event was completed and King had left the location where the
event had occurred, an experimenter timed
and recorded any visits King made to the other
two distractor locations (the two stimulus
locations where the event was not presented)
or any subsequent visits he made to the event
location.
Testing Phase Five minutes after the event
had been completed at the event location, the
tester was asked to test King. However, because
one of the testers was King's primary trainer, she
was not always available to test exactly after
the 5 minute retention interval. The retention
interval ranged from 4 to 17 minutes, with 6 minutes being the average. Before testing King, the
tester was asked to select the location where
he/she believed the event had occurred. This
was done to investigate whether there was a
correlation between the tester's choice and King s
response (i.e. whether the tester was inadvertently cueing King to the correct answer).
The tester then entered King's testing
area and asked King to come over. Then the tester
asked King, in English, where he had seen the
familiar person perform the unique event. The
tester showed King each of the three photo location cards, and placed the cards between the
bars of the cage. King was asked to take the

cards and make a response. Handing a card back
to the tester was scored as a response only if
King had taken all three cards into his cage, so
could see all of the cards before making a
decision. If King made a response before doing
this, the cards were replaced between the bars
and he was asked to make a selection again.
After King made a response, the tester
called out King's response to an out of view
experimenter, who then indicated to the tester
whether King was correct or incorrect. When
King was correct he was given a food reward
(an orange, banana, apple, or grapes) which
was part of his daily diet, as well as verbal
praise from the tester. King was asked to
return the location cards to the tester. If
another trial was scheduled for the day, the
tester would leave the testing area and another event would be presented. The average
interval between the time when an event was
tested for, and the time when the next event
was presented was an average of 6 minutes.

Results
King chose the correct location on 27 of
60 trials, for an overall accuracy of 45%, which
was significantly above chance using the
binomial test, p < .05. Although Kings overall
rate of accuracy was significantly above
chance, King exhibited a decline in performance throughout the experiment, showing
significantly above chance performance (60%)
during the first 20 trials of the experiment, but
declining to chance performance (38%) during
the last 40 trials of the experiment
Performance as a Function of Tester
B.L.S. did the majority of the testing. B.L.S.
tested on 39 trials and T.C. tested on 21 trials.
The testers appeared to be blind to the correct
location. The tester chose the correct location
on 20 of 60 trials (33%) which was not different
from chance guessing using the binomial test, p
< .05. Although neither tester was above
chance in predicting the correct location, T.C.
was more accurate than B.L.S. T.C. chose the
correct location on 48% of the trials, whereas
B.L.S. chose the correct location on 26% of the
trials. Therefore, it appears that one tester;
although not significantly above chance, was
more accurate than the other tester at predicting the correct location.
The testers did not appear to be inadvertently cueing King to the correct response.

King's responses were not correlated with the
tester's choices. King chose the same location
as T.C. on 53% of the trials, and King chose the
same location as B.LS. on 36% of the trials, both
of which were not significantly above chance.
However, on the trials in which tester T.C. did
choose the correct location, King also chose the
correct location 80% of the time, which was significantly above chance. On trials in which B. L.S.
chose the correct location, King chose the correct location only 20% of the time. However; on
the trials in which T.C. did not select the correct
location, King still chose the correct location 67%
of the time. King's performance was significantly
above chance when tested by T.C. (67%), but not
different from chance when tested by B.L.S.
(33%).
Performance as a Function of Event Location King was correct on 11 of 20 trials (55%)
when the tunnel was the event location, which
was significantly above chance using the binomial test, p .05. However, King was not significantly above chance when the event location was
the nighthouse (45%) or the main cage (35%). King
chose the tunnel location more frequently (40%)
than he chose the nighthouse (35%) and the main
cage (25%) even though the frequency of an event
occurring at any of the locations was the same
(33.%).
Analysis of Retroactive Interference
Trials in which King visited distractor locations
after leaving the event location were analyzed,
in order to determine whether visiting a
distractor location interfered with King's
ability to remember the location where the
event occurred; that is whether King experienced retroactive interference. On 20 of 60
trials King visited distractor locations after
leaving the event location. On 17 of these
trials King visited just one distractor after leaving the event location. On 2 of the trials King
visited a distractor location and then revisited
the event location. And on 1 trial King visited
two distractor locations after leaving the event
location. On the trials in which King visited one
or more distractor locations, King chose the event
location 45% of the time, the recently visited
distractor location 25% of the time, and an unvisited distractor location 25% of the time. On
the only trial in which King visited two distractor
locations, he chose the event location, despite
the fact that he had visited all three locations.
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It appears that King's performance was not af- tion, and had frequently spent time with experifected by retroactive interference, defined as menters at the main cage location, making it the
memory of subsequent visits after visiting the least salient of all of the locations. It appears
event location.
that King's less than optimal level of performance
Analysis of Proactive Interference Trials throughout the study may have been due to the
which were preceded by a previous trial on the fact that the locations (excluding the tunnel)
same day were analyzed, in order to determine were not novel to King.
Possibility of Cueing by Testers Both
whether the previous trial location interfered
with King's memory for the current event loca- testers appeared to be blind to the correct antion; that is whether King experienced proactive swer; and King's responses were not correlated
interference. King's accuracy was not signifi- with either of the tester's choices, suggesting
cantly above chance for the first trial on any given that King was not being cued by the testers.
day (35%), or the second trial (40%) using the However; when one tester (T.C.) did choose the
binomial test, p < .05. However; King's perfor- correct location, King chose the correct location
mance was significantly above chance on the third 80% of the time. Although this appears suspect
trial; he chose the correct location 60% of the at first glance, it cannot be concluded that King
time. King's low rate of accuracy for the first was being cued by her because if King was picktrials (35%) did not appear to be due to proac- ing up on cues given by the tester, King's retive interference from the last trial of the previ- sponses and the tester's choices should be highly
ous day. On the first trials of a day when King correlated. However; the correlation between
was incorrect, he chose the event location from King's response and T.C. 's choices was not sigthe last trial of the previous day on only 23% of nificantly above chance. Even on trials in which
the trials. It appears that King's performance T.C. chose an incorrect location, King was correct 67% of the time. It appears that King was
was not affected by proactive interference.
not being cued by T.C. because King was highly
Discussion
accurate when being tested by T.C. regardless of
King demonstrated above chance accuif she had chosen the correct location or an inracy for communicating palinscopic memory of
correct location.
where a unique event had occurred, after a reKing's Overall Low Rate of Accuracy Data
tention interval which presumably requires refrom
previous
research with King suggests that
trieval from long memory. King's responses were
not affected by visiting subsequent locations af- he exhibits higher levels of accuracy and attenter leaving the event location. When King vis- tion during the beginning of the experiment, and
ited distractor locations after leaving the event declines in accuracy and attention throughout
location, King still chose the event location the the study (Schwartz, personal communication).
majority of the time. On trials in which King In the current experiment, King's accuracy was
chose an incorrect location after visiting a quite high during the first 20 trials (60%), but his
distractor location, he was no more likely to performance during the last 40 trials was not sigchoose the recently visited distractor than an nificantly above chance. In addition, the three
unvisited distractor. Both of these findings sug- stimulus locations (excluding the tunnel) were
gest that King was not simply choosing the most not particularly novel to King, and this may have
recently visited location, but communicating his affected his performance. Due to excess weight
gain, King was put on a diet during the experimemory for where the event had occurred.
King's Accuracy for Different Locations ment, thus reducing the amount of fruit that
King demonstrated the highest accuracy for tun- could be given as reinforcement, which is cernel trials, lower accuracy for nighthouse trials, tainly a factor that could have influenced King's
and the lowest accuracy for main cage trials. This motivation to perform well.
may be a result of the relative saliency of the
Another factor that could have influenced
three locations. Before the experiment, King had King's accuracy is the nature of the task itself.
never seen anyone except his trainers at the tun- King has been a captive gorilla all of his life,
nel location, making it a truly memorable loca- being a former circus performer and currently a
tion. King had spent some time with experiment- zoo resident at Monkey Jungle. He acquired an
ers in his nighthouse, making it a less novel loca- outdoor habitat only 2 years before this study
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began. Compared to gorillas in the wild and cap- MacDonald, S.E. (1994). Gorillas' (Gorilla gotive gorillas who have been engaged in enrichrilla gorilla) spatial memory in a foraging
ment activities that promote their natural fortask. Journal of Comparative Psychology,
aging becomplex environment. However, King
108, 107-113.
has had many experiences with objects and MacDonald, S.E. Et Agnes, M.M. (1999). Orangutan (Pongo pygmaeus abelii) spatial
people during his time at Monkey Jungle. This
memory and behavior in a foraging task.
might explain why King was more accurate at
Journal
of Comparative Psychology, 113,
remembering "what" and "who" components of
213-217.
trial-unique events in the Schwartz et al.
study(2003), than remembering "where" infor- Mercado, E., III, Uyeyama, R.K., Pack, A.A. a
Herman, L.M. (1999). Memory for acmation in the current study.
tion
events in the bottle-nosed dolphin.
Episodic-Like Memory The present study
Animal
Cognition, 2,17-25.
replicates the Schwartz et al. (2003) finding of
Schwartz,
B.L.
(in press). Do non-human pripalinscopic memory at long-term memory retenmates have episodic memory? In H. Tertion intervals in the gorilla, King. However, unlrace Et J. Metcalfe (Eds). The missing
ike the Schwartz et al. (2003) study, King's relink
in cognition: Origins of self-knowsponses in the current study were not based on
ing consciousness.
trial-unique stimuli; in the present study the same
three locations were used throughout the experi- Schwartz, B.L., Colon, M.R., Sanchez, I.C.,
Rodriguez, I.A. a Evans, S. (2002).
ment. Although the current study does not fulSingle-trial learning of "what" and
fill the trial-unique requirement for episodic-like
"who" information in a gorilla (Gorilla
memory, the results do suggest that in addition
gorilla gorilla): implications for episodicto remembering "what" and "who" information,
memory. Animal Cognition, 5,85-90.
King is also capable of remembering "where"
information after long-term memory retention Schwartz, B.L. a Evans, S. (2001). Episodic
memory in primates. American journal
intervals. The fact that King was more likely to
of Primatology, 55, 71.
choose the event location than a distractor location, even after visiting up to two distractor lo- Schwartz, B.L., Meissner, C.A., Hoffman, M.,
Evans, S., Frazier, L.D. (2003). Event
cations, supports the claim that King's responses
memory
and misinformation effects in a
are not based on familiarity, but that King is comgorilla
(Gorilla
gorilla gorilla). Manumunicating information about a past event.
script submitted for publication.
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